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Under the circumstances defendant's belated criticism can-
not now prevail. (People v. Godina, 30 Cal.2d 356, 362 [181 
P.2d 881]; People v. Amaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 79 [251 P.2d 324] .) 
It may be noted that the trial court in ruling on defendant's 
motion for a new trial, specifically found that ''there was no 
reversible misconduct on the part of the deputy district at-
torney nor is there any reason to believe that the jury was 
moved by passion and prejudice." 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, .T., Edmonds, J., Carter, .T., and 
Traynor, .T., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-Upon the facts of this case I 
concur in the judgment and generally in the reasoning leading 
to the conclusion. 
I do not join in the implied blanket approval of all the 
instructions said to have been ''approved in the Tuthill case'' 
(referring to People v. Tttthill (1947), 31 Cal.2d 92, 99-101 
[187 P.2d 16] ). 
[L. A. No. 22352. In Bank. Sept. 25, 1953.] 
CAROL DIE'l'RICH, Respondent, v. NOAH DIETRICH, 
Appellant. 
[1] Divorce- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-Ordi-
narily if a ceremonial marriage is shown and if the ceremony 
is followed by assumption of marital relations, no further 
proof of fact of marriage need be made in preliminary pro-
ceedings to sustain an award of temporary alimony, court 
costs and attorneys' fees, and an extended inquiry into close 
questions as to validity of marriage will not and need not be 
allowed in such preliminary proceedings. 
[2] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Jurisdiction.-The existence of mar-
riage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for right of court to order 
support, costs and counsel fees pendente lite in action for 
[1] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 542. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5-12] Divorce, § 183(2); [2] Di-
vorce, § 178; [4] Divorce, §§ 183(2), 191(5); [13, 15] Divorce, 
§307; [14] Marriage, §35; [16] Divorce, §180(1); [17] Divorce, 
§ 180; [18] Divorce, § 188. 
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divorce or separate maintenance, and the invalidity of the 
marriage may be shown at any time. 
[3] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Even though 
defendant in a divorce action denies existence of marriage, 
court may make order requiring payment of temporary ali-
mony, costs and attorneys' fees if defendant is given oppor-
tunity to be heard and marriage is proved by preponderance of 
evidence. 
[4] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage: Effect of Order. 
-Although an order of court requiring payment of temporary 
alimony, costs and attorneys' fees implies a finding of existence 
of marriage, the proceeding need not be so complete nor evi-
dence so extensive as on trial of issues of case, and the order 
therefore does not finally determine those issues nor affect 
the final judgment. 
[5] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-A mere show-
ing that parties to divorce action had once participated in a 
marriage ceremony does not absolutely and in all events pre-
clude defendant, on hearing of application for temporary 
alimony and suit money, from being heard in challenge of fact 
of marriage or from introducing evidence tending to show 
invalidity of marriage. 
[6] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-An oppor-
tunity "to be heard," with reference to existence of marriage 
on hearing of application for temporary alimony and suit 
money, means an opportunity to contest. 
[7] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Since the ad-
verse party in response to an application for temporary sup-
port in a divorce action must be given an opportunity to be 
heard and to present his evidence although the resulting 
judgment is temporary in effect, in any given situation it must 
depend on facts of case whether evidence relating to fact of 
marriage and, in particular, evidence tending to show that a 
ceremonial marriage in fact amounted to no more than a 
marriage ceremony, may be properly excluded. 
[8] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Where, mar-
riage in fact being denied, the affirmative is on party claiming 
to be wife to show that an actual marital relation ever existed, 
alimony will be denied until that fact is proven to satisfaction 
of court or is admitted, since it is on existence of that relation 
alone that right to alimony depends. 
[9] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-Where an 
actual marital relation has been admitted or shown and its 
existence in law is sought to be avoided by some fact set up 
by husband, and it devolves on him to show that fact, alimony 
will be granted until that fact is shown, since the relation 
actually exists on which the right to alimony depends an4 
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object of litigation is to annul that actual relation by showing 
some other fact, the existence of which is denied. 
[10] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-For purposes 
of application for temporary alimony there will be no need 
that the fact of marriage be so conclusively established as for 
purpose of permanent alimony or any other ultimate purpose 
of action. 
[11] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-It is for 
interest of society and in aid of public policy that, where 
married relation has been in fact assumed and where it is 
averred by putative wife and denied by alleged husband, if 
she makes a reasonably plain case of its existence she should 
be furnished with means of temporary support and of con-
ducting the suit until truth or falsity of her allegations can 
be ascertained by proofs formally taken in case. 
[12] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Where it ap-
pears, on hearing of application for temporary alimony and 
suit money, that there was a ceremony of marriage coupled 
with an actual and bona fide assumption of marital relations, 
and where husband, who participated in such ceremony, with 
knowledge of circumstances under which wife obtained foreign 
divorce decree dissolving a prior marriage, offers proof to 
show that his marriage to her was invalid because her previous 
divorce was invalid, a ruling excluding such evidence is proper. 
[13] !d.-Foreign Divorces-Collateral Attack.-Where husband 
against whom wife brought separate maintenance action went 
through marriage ceremony with full knowledge of circum-
stances under which wife obtained a foreign divorce decree 
dissolving a prior marriage, husband is estopped to assert in-
validity of such decree on hearing of wife's application for 
temporary alimony and suit money. 
[14] Marriage - Annulment- Prior Existing Marriage.-Where 
marriage was contracted in reliance on divorce obtained by 
wife from previous husband, public policy requires recognition 
of second marriage rather than its annulment on ground of in-
validity of divorce decree. 
[15] Divorce-Foreign Divorces- Collateral Attack.-Civ. Code, 
§ 150.1, declaring that "A divorce obtained in another juris-
diction shall be of no force or effect in this State, if both 
parties to the marriage were domiciled in this State at the time 
the proceeding for the divorce was commenced," may not be 
successfully invoked by second husband who participated in 
marriage ceremony with full knowledge of circumstances under 
which wife obtained foreign divorce decree from first hus-
[13] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 157; Am.Jur., Di-
vorce and Separation, § 742 et seq. 
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band, since second husband by his conduct with relation to 
that decree has no standing to question it. 
[16] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Financial Condition of Parties.-
While a wife is not entitled to temporary alimony when she 
has independent income sufficient to enable her to support 
herself, husband fails to show that trial court ignored this 
rule where monthly amount of award for support is approxi-
mately $4,087, where wife offered evidence that amount re-
quired was approximately $5,028.85, and where her separate 
income is $1,100 monthly. 
[17] !d.-Counsel Fees-Circumstances Affecting.-In determining 
amount of reasonable counsel fees to be allowed wife in her 
separate maintenance action and husband's cross-action for 
annulment or divorce, trial court may consider nature of liti-
gation, its complexity, nature and extent of contest, amount 
involved, financial circumstances of parties, skill required, 
professional standing and reputation of husband's attorneys 
and of attorneys selected by wife. 
[18] !d.-Counsel Fees-Amount of Allowance.-In wife's action 
for separate maintenance wherein husband cross-complained 
for annulment or divorce, award to wife of $10,000 as attor-
neys' fees is not excessive where litigation is complicated and 
vigorously contested, the amounts involved are considerable 
(according to wife's questionnaire the net worth of community 
property exceeds $2,500,000, and according to husband's ques-
tionnaire his net worth is $1,014,626), and the standing and 
ability of counsel are high. 
APPEAL from portions of an order of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County allowing alimony, counsel fees and 
costs. Orlando H. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed. 
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright and 
Charles A. Loring for Appellant. 
Jennings & Belcher and Frank B. Belcher for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff Carol Dietrich brought an action 
for separate maintenance against her alleged husband, Noah 
Dietrich. Noah answered, admitting a "purported marnage 
ceremony" but claiming that there was no valid marriage 
because at the time of the ceremony Carol was the wife of 
another man; i. e., was not validly divorced from a previous 
husband. Noah also cross-complained, seeking an annulment, 
or, in the alternative, a divorce. Carol obtained an order to 
show cause and, after hearing, the trial court ordered, among 
other things, that Noah pay $10,000 on account of her attor-
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neys' fees, $2,750 monthly for her support pendente lite, and 
certain property taxes and insurance premiums. Noah ap-
peals from those portions of the order. He does not attack 
an award of $750 monthly for the support of the three minor 
children of himself and Carol. 
Noah contends that (1) the trial court erred to his prejudice 
in rejecting offered proof intended to show that his marriage 
to Carol was invalid because her previous divorce was invalid; 
(2) if it is assumed that it had jurisdiction to award tempor-
ary support, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of 
such award. We have concluded that these contentions are 
without merit. 
The parties went throug·h a California marriage ceremony 
on May 23, 1936, one day after the entry in Nevada of a 
decree which recited that Carol was granted a divorce from 
Harold Moore. At the hearing on the order to show cause 
in the present California divorce proceeding Noah made the 
following offer of proof to show that at the time of the Cali-
fornia marriage ceremony Carol was not legally divorced 
from Moore. Carol accepted Noah's proposal of marriage in 
September, 1935, while she was still married to Moore. She 
knew that Noah was a legal resident of Texas and she planned 
that after she divorced Moore and married Noah she would 
leave California and make her home in Texas. On April 4, 
1936, Carol and Moore were both legal residents of California. 
On that day she went to Nevada for the sole purpose of simu-
lating a residence and obtaining a divorce. During the period 
between April 4, 1936, and May 22, 1936, she frequently wrote 
to Noah; her letters, among other things, referred to her in-
tention to make Texas her permanent home after their mar-
riage, described her stay in Nevada as a "sojourn," referred 
to the obtaining of a divorce as "the purpose of my trip," and 
discussed Noah's arrangements for their contemplated honey-
moon voyage. During this same period Carol made several 
overnight visits to Los Angeles, and on one trip remained in 
Los Angeles for more than 24 hours, despite the fact that 
before she left California for Nevada she had written Noah 
that ''As I understand the Nevada requirements, I couldn't 
possibly return here for even a day after establishing my 
residence there. . . . It wouldn't do to run any risk of later 
having it declared invalid." In obtaining the Nevada decree 
Carol used a power of attorney from Moore ; Moore was never 
present in Nevada during the period from April 4 to May 22, 
1936; and Carol paid all the expenses of the Nevada action. 
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Noah also offered to prove that he "learned for the first 
time that there was some question regarding the legality of 
the Nevada divorce ... in November, 1951" (Carol insti-
tuted this action November 13, 1951) ; however, there is no 
question that Noah knew of the above described circumstances 
under which Carol obtained the Nevada decree. 
The only portion of the offered proof which the trial court 
admitted in evidence was an exemplified copy of the judgment 
roll of the Nevada action. This copy shows that Moore, by 
Nevada counsel, appeared and answered, denying Carol's alle-
gation that she was a bona fide resident of Nevada, and that 
the Nevada court found that such allegation was true. The 
trial court in the present proceeding rejected the balance of 
the offered proof upon three stated grounds: (1) Noah's con-
duct in connection with Carol's obtaining the Nevada decree 
estops him from attacking it. (2) Noah cannot attack the 
Nevada decree because he is not a party to or interested in 
it. (3) Noah is precluded from attacking the decree by the 
full faith and credit clause (U. S. Const., art. IV, § 1). 
Carol urges that the evidence was properly excluded for 
the reasons stated by the trial court and also urges that, re-
gardless of the correctness of those stated grounds, once a 
ceremonial marriage is established then ''in any and all events 
under those circumstances she is entitled to alimony pendente 
lite.'' 
[1] It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily if 
a ceremonial marriage is shown, and if the ceremony is fol-
lowed by the assumption of marital relations, no further proof 
of the fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceed-
ings in order to sustain an award of temporary alimony, court 
costs and attorneys' fees, and an extended inquiry into close 
questions as to the validity of the marriage will not be, and 
need not be, allowed in such preliminary proceedings. 
[2] Fundamentally, as declared in Colbert v. Colbert (1946), 
28 Cal.2d 276, 279 [169 P.2d 839], "The existence of the 
marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the right of the 
court to order support, costs, and counsel fees pendente lite 
in an action for divorce or separate maintenance. [Citations.] 
And the invalidity of the marriage, as is true of any juris-
dictional prerequisite, may be shown at any time.'' [3] And 
as pointed out in Carbone v. Superior Court (1941), 18 Cal.2d 
768, 771-772 [117 P.2d 872, 136 A.L.R. 1260], "Even though 
the defendant in an action for divorce denies the existence of 
the marriage, the court may nevertheless make the order if 
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defendant is given an opportunity to be heard and the mar-
riage is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . 
[4] .Although such an order implies a finding of the exist-
ence of the relationship, the proceeding need not be so com-
plete nor the evidence so extensive as upon the trial of the 
issues of the case and the order therefore does not determine 
those issues nor affect the final judgment. [Citations.] " 
[5] The above stated general rule does not mean, however, 
that the mere showing that the words of a marriage ceremony 
have been said, absolutely and in all events precludes a de-
fendant on an order to show cause from being heard in chal-
lenge of the fact of marriage. .Absurd results could follow 
if we accepted Carol's broad contention that in no event, on 
the hearing of an application for temporary alimony and 
suit money, can evidence tending to show the invalidity of an 
admitted ceremonial marriage be received; for example, a 
spouse could be required to pay temporary alimony even 
though he or she could show-and offered to show conclusively 
-that in the very same court the marriage now relied on had 
been previously annulled at the instance of the other spouse 
by a judgment which had become final and that such spouse 
had remarried. To absolutely exclude such evidence simply 
because of the fact that the parties had once participated in 
a ceremony of marriage would deny verity to the substance 
of the rule, as stated in the Carbone case, that ''Even though 
the defendant in an action for divorce denies the existence of 
the marriage, the court may nevertheless make the order if 
defendant is given an opportunity to be heard and the mar-
riage is proved by a preponderance of the evidence." (Italics 
added.) [6] .An opportunity "to be heard" means an oppor-
tunity to contest. To give full effect to the rule for which 
Carol contends would mean that the opportunity of an adverse 
party to be heard would be satisfied and concluded if he or 
she were permitted to be present when the one seeking tem-
porary alimony produced an authenticated copy of a recorded 
certificate of marriage of the parties. [7] Since, as stated 
in the Carbone case, supra (at p. 772 of 18 Cal.2d), the ad-
verse party, in response to an application for temporary sup-
port in a paternity or divorce action, ''must be given an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present his evidence ... [although] 
[t]he resulting judgment is temporary in effect," it appears 
that in any given situation it must depend on the facts of 
the case whether evidence relating to the fact of marriage, 
and, in particular, evidence tending to show that a ceremonial 
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marriage in fact amounted to no more than a marriage cere-
mony (i. e., was a mock marriage or, for any conclusive and 
readily provable reason was wholly void or had already been 
annulled or dissolved) may be properly excluded. 
[8] In Bancroft v. Bancroft ( 1935), 9 Cal.App.2d 464, 
468 l50 P .2d 465], the District Court of Appeal quoted with 
approval from Brinkley v. Brinkley (1872), 50 N.Y. 184, 193 
l10 Am.Rep. 460], as follows: " 'And the principle at the 
bottom is this: Where, marriage in fact being denied, the 
affirmative is upon the party claiming to be the wife 1 to show 
that an actual marital relation ever existed, there alimony 
will be denied until that fact is proven to the satisfaction of 
the court, or is admitted; for it is upon the existence of that 
relation alone that the right to alimony depends. [9] Where 
an actual marital relation has been admitted or shown. and 
its existence in law is sought to be avoided by some fact set 
up by the husband, and it devolves upon him to show that 
fact, there alimony will be granted until that fact is shown; 
for the relation actually exists upon which the right to alimony 
depends, and the object of the litigation is to annul that actual 
relation by showing some other fact, the existence of which is 
denied. [10] It may be said, too, that for the purposes of 
~:~n application for temporary alimony there will not be need 
that the fact of marriage be so conclusively established as for 
the purpose of permanent alimony, or any other ultimate 
purpose of the action. [11] It is for the interest of soriety 
and in aid of public policy that, where the married relation 
has been in fact assumed ... and where it is avern'd by 
the putative wife and denied by the alleged husband. if shr 
makes a reasonable plain case of its existence, she should be 
furnished with means of temporary support and of conducting 
the suit until the truth or falsehood of her allegations can 
be ascertained by the proofs formally taken in the case. ' '' 
(See, also, 35 Am.Jur. 226, 227, § 70.) 
[12] Applying the above stated principles, which we adopt. 
to the present case, since it appears that there was a ceremony 
of marriage coupled with an actual and bona fide assumption 
of marital relations, and considering the character of thP 
.attack on the validity of the marriage, it is obvious that the 
exclusionary ruling was proper and may be sustained at this 
stage of the proceedings on this ground alone. 
'In California, since the rights and obligations of husband and wife 
are mutual and reciprocal (Civ. Code, § 137), the principles stated apply 
interchangeably to either husband or wife as the case may be. 
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There is, however, another and more fundamental ground 
which not only is controlling at this stage of the proceedings 
but presumptively will be controlling on the trial as well. 
[13] On this record it is immediately obvious that the very 
evidence offered to show the invalidity of the ceremonial mar-
riage was properly excluded because that same evidence shows 
that Noah is estopped to assert the claimed invalidity of the 
Nevada divorce. With full knowledge of the circumstances 
under which that divorce was obtained, and in reliance on 
such divorce, Noah went through a marriage ceremony and 
lived with Carol as her husband for many years. [14] The 
public policy of this state, in the circumstances of this case, 
as in those considered in Rediker v. Rediker (1950), 35 Cal.2d 
796, 808 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], requires recogni-
tion of the second marriage rather than the "dubious attempt 
to resurrect the original" marriage. (See, also, Watson v. 
Watson (1952), 39 Cal.2d 305, 307 [246 P.2d 19].) 
[15] Noah urges that the public policy applicable here 
is stated in section 150.1 of the Civil Code, which provides 
that "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be 
of no force or effect in this State, if both parties to the mar-
riage were domiciled in this State at the time the proceeding 
for the divorce was commenced.'' But we are not considering 
the "force or effect" of the Nevada deer ~e except as such 
consideration is necessarily incident to th( !Jlding that Noah, 
because of his conduct with relation to tttat decree, has no 
standing to question it. 
Since we have determined that Noah's offer of proof shows 
that he is estopped to question the Nevada decree, it is un-
necessary, either in respect to the order directly concerned 
or for the guidance of the court at the trial on the merits, to 
pass upon the correctness of the other stated grounds of the 
trial court's exclusionary ruling. 
Noah claims that the amount awarded for support is exces-
sive, beyond his ability to pay, and does not take into account 
Carol's separate income. The total annual amount which 
Noah is required to pay for support of Carol and the children 
(including insurance and county taxes on the home where 
Carol and the children live) is $49,030.61. According to the 
wife's questionnaire, necessary expenses of herself and the 
children are $5,028.85 monthly and her separate income is 
$1,100 monthly. There is evidence that these figures are 
substantially correct. Noah's net income for 1950, after pay-
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ment of income taxes, was $197,139.32; the expense of main-
taining the family, with Noah living in the family home (from 
which he has since moved), was $85,567.76. An increase of 
about $20,000 in taxes for the year 1951 was expected. Ac-
cording to the husband's questionnaire, his necessary annual 
expenses total $14,820. 
If the above figures are accepted it appears that Noah 
would have the ability to pay the amount awarded. His con-
tention that he did not have such ability is based in part 
upon a view of his estimated income less favorable than that 
accepted by the trial court and in part upon considering the 
award of attorney fees as if it were part of the support award. 
[16] Noah is correct in his statement of the proposition 
that a wife is not entitled to temporary alimony when she 
has independent income sufficient to enable her to support 
herself. (Loeb v. Loeb (1948), 84 Cal.App.2d 141, 146 [190 
P.2d 246]; Spreckels v. Spreckels (1952), 111 Cal.App.2d 
529, 533 [244 P.2d 917].) But he does not show that the trial 
court ignored this rule. The monthly amount of the award 
for support is approximately $4,087. As stated above, Carol 
offered evidence that the amount required was approximately 
$5,028.85. Thus the total amount available to her, with her 
own separate income of $1,100, is approximately the amount 
which she requested and testified that she required. From 
this we may assume that the trial court took into account her 
separate income when it fixed the amount of the award. 
Noah complains that the award of $10,000 on account of 
Carol's attorneys' fees was excessive. [17] The situation 
is similar to .that in Pope v. Pope (1951), 107 Cal.App.2d 
537, 539 [237 P.2d 312] : "In determining the amount of a 
reasonable fee the trial court is permitted to consider various 
factors: The nature of the litigation, its complexity, the nature 
and extent of the contest, the amount involved, the financial 
circumstances of the parties, the skill required, the professional 
standing and reputation of the husband's attorneys and of 
the attorneys selected by the wife, are some of the relevant 
matters to be considered. [Citations.] " 
[18] Here the litigation is complicated and vigorously 
contested; the amounts involved are considerable (according 
to the wife's questionnaire the net worth of community prop-
erty exceeds $2,500,000 ; according to the husband's question-
naire his net worth is $1,014,626); and the standing and 
ability of counsel are high. 
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For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
conclusion reached, but dissent from that part of the opinion 
which holds that the defendant may not, on the trial of the 
case, offer proof of the invalidity of the plaintiff's divorce 
from her first husband. 
The existence of an estoppel is a question of fact (10 Cal. 
Jur., 656; Gump v. Gt~mp, 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [108 P.2d 21]; 
Assets Corp. v. Perrin Properties, Inc., 48 Cal.App.2d 220 
[119 P.2d 375] ; Judelson v. American JJ1etal Bearing Oo., 89 
Cal.App.2d 256 [200 P.2d 836]), and the burden of proof 
is on the party asserting the doctrine (Garrett v. Cook, 89 
Cal.App.2d 98 [200 P.2d 21] ). 
The vital principle· of equitable estoppel is that he who by 
his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not 
otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or 
injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. 
Four things are essential to the application of the doctrine: 
(1) The party to be estopzJed must be apprised of the facts; 
(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or 
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right 
to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be 
ignorant of the true state of facts; ( 4) the other party must 
rely upon the conduct to his injury. Defendant's offer of 
proof showed that plaintiff went to Nevada for the sole purpose 
of obtaining a decree of divorce; that she did not remain in 
that state continuously for the six weeks' period of residence 
which is the jurisdictional prerequisite demanded by that 
forum; that defendant did not know, prior to November, 1951, 
of the invalidity of the Nevada judgment of divorce awarded 
to plaintiff from her first husband; that there is no evidence 
that defendant aided, assisted, or counseled plaintiff to pro-
cure a decree of divorce in Nevada. An objection was sus-
tained by the trial court to this offer of proof. Plaintiff 
offered no evidence controverting defendant's allegations. It 
would appear to me that on the record here the first element 
of an estoppel is missing-that the party to be estopped must 
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be apprised of the facts-in that defendant did not know of 
the invalidity of the Nevada divorce; the second element is 
present-defendant married plaintiff intending that his con-
duct be acted upon; the third element is missing-plaintiff 
was not ignorant of the true state of facts; the fourth element 
is probably present-plaintiff relied upon the marriage to 
defendant although the element of injury is problematical. 
Upon the trial, if defendant is permitted to litigate the ques-
tion, plaintiff will also be permitted to introduce evidence 
which may have the effect of supplying the missing elements. 
In previous cases where one spouse has been held estopped 
from denying the validity of a previous divorce, additional 
elements have been present. The estopped spouse has aided, 
abetted, counseled, or actively participated by paying the 
expenses, etc. in the procurement of the fraudulent divorce. 
In Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 806 [221 P.2d 1, 20 
A.I-'.R.2d 1152], we said "The doctrine of estoppel has also 
been held applicable to cases in which a husband sought to 
assert the invalidity of his or his wife's earlier divorce from 
another as a defense to her action for divorce and alimony.'' 
Cited as authority are Margulies v. Margttlies, 109 N.J.Eq. 
391, 392 [157 A. 676] and VanSlyke v. VanSlyke, 186 Mich. 
324, 330 [152 N.W. 921]. Both of these cases held estopped 
a spouse who had actively participated in the procurement of 
a fraudulent divorce which he later sought to have declared 
invalid. I feel, therefore, that under the facts as here pre-
sented, this court should not preclude defendant from offer-
ing proof at the trial of the invalidity of plaintiff's Nevada 
decree of divorce. 
While I feel that in view of the services rendered, the 
amount awarded is excessive, I do not feel that I should say 
that the award of attorneys' fees in this case is an abuse of 
discretion. 
A ceremonial marriage between plaintiff and defendant 
having been established the court could properly exercise its 
discretion in making a preliminary award of alimony pendente 
lite, attorneys' fees and costs without hearing evidence as to 
the invalidity of the marriage, reserving to the trial on its 
merits the consideration of such evidence. 
I, therefore, concur in the affirmance of the award. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
22, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
